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education are important fields ofgovemment action. Many analysts, however, would
notagree thatthe policies ofthepre-eighties have hadno impact onthe eighties. Rather,
the crisis ofthe eighties can only be understood refering to international policies in the
pre-phase which was led by a strong desire for industrialization. In my opinion, the
book still makes some valuable points conceming the ongoing discussion ofdevelop-
ment strategies, though, it raises some outdated arguments.
Ernst-August Nuppenau
Williams, George, T h e AirIi neInd u st r y a n d thelm p a c t 0 f Dere -
gulat ion. Altershot, Brookfield 1993. Ashgate. XII, 188 pp.
On January 1st, 1993, the EC Commission implemented the so-called "third pack-
age" for the liberalization ofthe European air transport sector. Since this date, the EC
airlines are allowed to serve any city-pair between two Community member states and
to compete on fares and capacity on cross-border services, without regulatory restrie-
tions. While these changes in the traditional regulatory framework are far-reaching,
there is still a lack ofconsensus between observers of this industry what will be the
future prospects of the liberalized European air transport sector. This serves as the
background for George Williams' book, in which he analyzes the past experiences
which were made with liberalized air transport markets in the United States, Western
Europe, Canada and Australia.
Chapters 1to 3deal with the evolution ofthe marketstructure afterthe deregulation
oftheUS airline industry in 1978. The analysis starts with a look back to the eraoftight
economic regulation of this sector. The traditional regulatory framework consisted
mainly ofa system ofrestricted route entry, coupled with a rate-ofreturn price regula-
tion. The carriers' actions had therefore been limited to the field ofservice competition,
this resulted in low load factors and poor financial performance of the carriers. The
proponents of deregulation expected a much improved performance of the airline
industry once the regulatory restrietions would have been removed, resulting in lower
fares and betterservice standards. The intellectual background for deregulation was the
"Theory ofContestable Markets", which predicted that an abuse ofmarket power in
liberalized markets by incumbents would be unlikely to emerge because of the small
degree ofsunk costs inherent in the industry.
What did really happen in the markets after the passing ofthe deregulation act by
the U.S. Congress in 1978? In the early years after deregulation, many new entrants
entered the scene, which led to fierce price and service competition. To respond to the
new competitive pressures, the incumbents had to develop new strategie weapons for
survival against their new vital competitors; and they managed it welle At the beginning
of the 1990s, the US air transport sector was dominated by a small number oflarge
"mega" carriers. The only other airlines that have survived are those that have been
serving specific market niches. Of crucial importance for the success of the trunk
carriers was the restructuring oftheir networks, the growing importance ofcomputer-
ized reservation systems, the inauguration offrequent-flyer programs and the growing
number ofcode-sharing agreements between trunk and commuter airlines. All these
strategies aim onextracting the maximum ofconsumer rents for the airlines and to raise
rivals' costs. The success ofthese strategies mainly relied on the exploitation ofecono-
mies ofscope and scale inherent in this industry. The net impact has been to provide
positions for market dominance to a small number ofvery large carriers. Nevertheless,
although the present structure ofthe US airline market is characterized by tight oligo-666 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
polies, on the whole George Williams judges the deregulation to have been successful:
To date the average fares are some 15 per cent lower than could have been expected if
the traditional regulatory regime had still been in force. However, although the vast
majority ofU.S. domestic passengers have benefitted, not all passengers are better off
under deregulation. Especially the high-yield passengers who live in hub cities nowa-
days have to pay considerably higher fares than before deregulation.
In Chapter 4, the author turns to the more gradual approach ofliberalization in
Western Europe. At the beginning, Williams points to the different characteristics
between the US and the Western European market, and wams to simply transform the
US experience into expectations about the likely outcome in liberalized air transport
markets in Europe. The most basic of these differences are the existence of 22 au-
tonomous states in Western Europe, the size of the Western European air transport
market, which is much smaller than its US equivalent, and the strong market position
of European charter carriers. Traditionally, the air transport sector in Europe was
characterized by a system of bilateral agreements between souvereign states. George
Williams intensively describes the process ofpartialliberalization in Europe, starting
with the slow erosion ofthe traditional regulatory regime in the 1970s, thatwas due to
the growing competitive pressures from charter operations, and ending with the Com-
mission's proposals for the so-called "thirdpackage" ofliberalization. How did incum-
bents react to the changing regulatory conditions? Extensive hub-and-spoke route
systems were alreadyestablishedin Europeanairtransport. The mainstrategic response
ofthe European carriers to the opening ofthe markets for new competition has been
the elimination or neutralizing of potentially powerful competitors through mergers,
alliances and code-sharing agreements.
The liberalizatiol) ofCanada's airline industry took place between 1979 and 1988
(Chapter 5). Formerly, there had been a strong demarcation in service between trunk
airlines. The function ofthe regional carriers had been to supply services to supplement
the trunk activities of the two national carriers but not to offer competition against
them. Again, as in the United States and in Europe, the unlocking ofthe market led to
a rapid absorption ofCanada's regional air carriers by the two trunkcarriers. The two
relevant features of the Australian airline industry had been the total seperation of
international and domestic services and the adoptionofa "two airline policy" covering
internal interstate services. As a result ofthe removal ofthe restrictions on route entry
and capacity determination in 1987, only one of the many prospective entrants had
actually materialized. This airline survived for only one year.
Thus, the evolution of the market structure in deregulated airline markets have
shown a strong trend towards consolidation ofthe industry. This raises the question if
there is some justification for reregulation. In Chapter 6, Williams turns to this topic,
drawing a coherent line from the justification ofregulation policy as an instrument to
prevent consumers to be exploited by monopolistic firms, the materializing trend of
ever-widening the regulatory control, and the changing attitudes of economists to
regulatory practices as became apparent in Stigler's "Capture Theory", leading to the
"Theory ofContestable Markets". After referring to these paradigms, Williams states
that whether to completely deregulate an industry depends critically on the ability of
incumbents to establish barriers to entry in an otherwise free marketplace.
Chapter 7 deals with the prospects for competition in a global marketplace. On a
global scale, trends ofinternational consolidation ofthe industry through cross-border
aquisitions and global alliances have become apparent. The author feels that the
formation of worldwide alliances is likely to result in less competitive pressures, al-
though the extent to which the industry will become really global is as yet unclear.
Pointing to the past experlences with liberalized airline markets, George Williams
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recognizes, however, that to turn back to the traditional tools ofeconomic regulation
is not an appropriate answer, given the distortions that it caused. Instead what will be
needed, Williams states, will be some form of regulatory policy which allows the
authorities a flexible response to the dynamics ofthe markets. In Chapter 9, Williams
presents his idea how to achieve this goal: He advocates the use of franchising route
licenses. Licenses would come up for renewal, and be tendered for, every few years. This
instrument works as folIows: The regulatory authority franchises route licenses for
particular city-pairs. Every airline can bid for a route, except airlines which were
engaged in predatory practices prior to the tendering process. The author thinks that
the danger to lose a lucrative route in the next tendering round will be a sufficient threat
to prevent the carriers from engaging in predatory behavior.
George Williams' book presents a comprehensive and careful overview of past
experiences with liberalized air transport markets. The message is that economies of
scope are animportantcharacteristicofthe airline industry which creates a strongtrend
for unregulated markets to evolve "naturally" oligopolistic. What I have missed, how-
ever, when reading the book, was a deeper analysis ofthe important welfare implica-
tions associated with economies ofscope and density: One might have hoped for more
details on the potential trade-offbetween efficiency (in a static sense) and competition.
This would have given the reader some idea ofhow to evaluate specific problems that
evolve in the competitive marketplace. Let me give an example: A computerized reser-
vation system enables the airline owning it to fine-tune its pricing schemes and flight
schedules, but also to make the information biased for consumers. Information which
is not available to competitors but only for the CRS-owning airline is, of course, a
specific barrier to entry, but information itselfis a valuable tool to optimize the supply
ofairtransport services. I would have welcomed ifthe author had pointed more clearly
to both sides ofthe medal, and had further discussed how to avoid the negative effects
of using computerized reservation systems as a tool to erect entry barriers, while
preserving the social benefits thatspring from these systems. Forexample, it might have
been worthwile to consider seperation ofownership from their use by the same airline.
The idea to use route franchises as an instrument to ensure a pro-competitive
environment, is interesting and worthwhile to debate. But I get the feeling that George
Williams stops where the real problems ofimplementing a system ofroute franchising
begin. Probablythemostimportantquestionin this contextis how to identify predatory
behavior. It is well known that a characteristic feature in air transport is joint produc-
tion and that marginal costs are nearly zero for an additional passenger once a route
has been established. Whatare the implications for the detection ofpredatory practices?
Another problem is how to determine the airport slots which are necessary to operate
a route. Ifthe regulatory authority would assign certain slots to specific routes, as the
author proposes, the air transport system might lose a considerable degree offlexibility
in how to use scarce airport (and air traffic control) infrastructure. Another shortcom-
ing ofthe book is that the author concentrates on the idea ofroute franchising without
discussing alternative pro-competitive policies; e.g opening up the European market for
foreign carriers. It would have had much appeal to compare alternative policy strate-
gies.
Though, in my opinion the book remains too descriptive where it could have been
more analytic, it is still worth to be read by those interested in the airline industry who
need compact andcomprehensive information aboutthe experiences with liberalized air
transport markets. It might also serve as a point for further research into questions
dealing with the problem how to ensure a competitive environment in unregulated air
transport markets (as well as others), which are characterized by economies ofscope.
Hartrnut Wolf